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We present a framework to evaluate the impact of digital music distribution. We set 
up a representative model that enables the comparative static analysis. We then interpret 
two empirical observations about the music industry, the sales decline and the price 
constancy, and fit the model to these observations. We find that, while the impact of 
digitalization on the producers’ profits is probably negative, it may not be as severe as 
the observed impact on the quantity. On the other hand, the impact of digitalization on 
the consumer surplus is unambiguously positive. The impact on the social welfare is 
rather ambiguous, but numerical calculations reveal that the social welfare has increased 
for most parameter values. We also show that enhanced copyright protection to 
counteract the impacts of digitalization may have an unexpected effect on the social 
welfare. JEL Classification: K11; L86; O34 
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The music industry has experienced significant changes in recent years. In particular, 
the advent of broadband networks made it possible to freely download unauthorized 
copies of pre-recorded music files via peer-to-peer (P2P) technologies: Consumers can 
transmit the music in digital format among themselves using the online ‘file-sharing’ 
technology provided by Napster, Kazaa, Grokster, and others. These changes have 
generated heated debates regarding the possible impacts on the sound-recording industry. 
Some argue that the decline in the sales of recorded music endangers the viability of the 
industry, while others say that these changes may ultimately benefit the producers. 
There exist some empirical works including Michel (2006), Oberholzer and Strumpf 
(2005), Peitz and Waelbroeck (2004), and Zentner (2006), as well as some theoretical 
discussion including Liebowitz (2005, 2006) and Peitz and Waelbroeck (2005, 2006b) 
on the impacts of file-sharing technology. Most of the works, however, are concerned 
with the causes for the sales decline of pre-recorded music.
1 In particular, no previous 
work has studied the welfare consequences. 
This paper aims to provide a framework to evaluate the impact of digital music 
distribution on the social welfare as well as on the profit and the consumer surplus. To 
do so, we set up a representative model that enables the comparative static analysis 
before and after the advent of digital distribution technology. 
The ‘digitalization,’ i.e., the distribution of music files in digital format using online 
technology, affects several aspects of the industry. First, the unauthorized copies shared 
among end-users create competitive pressure on the legitimate products. That is, the 
copies are (inferior) substitutes for the original, and so possibly harm the producers of 
the music by decreasing their sales and profits. On the other hand, it is often argued that 
the ‘sampling,’ i.e., consumers’ listening to the music before purchasing and finding the 
better fits for their tastes, afforded by the online technology may in effect boost the 
demand for the original, and help the producers. Finally, the digitalization may lower 
the producers’ costs of distribution, marketing, and promotion. 
   It is ultimately an empirical question to determine the net impacts of digitalization. 
Hence, after setting up a framework to evaluate the impacts, we start with interpreting 
                                            
1  See Section 3 below for some of their results.   3
two empirical observations of the music industry. The first and the most obvious 
observation is the sales decline. Liebowitz (2006, p. 14), for example, estimates that the 
actual sales in the United States have dropped up to 30% after digitalization. While 
various explanations are possible, it is most plausible that the file sharing activity 
exerted a strong substitution effect. Another interesting and rather puzzling observation 
is the virtual constancy of price. Liebowitz (2006, p. 21) again observes that ‘the list 
prices adjusted for inflation have been virtually constant for the last decade.’ If the 
unauthorized copies are substitutes, then the price of the legitimate copies should have 
decreased due to the competitive pressure. That did not happen, however. 
      Several reasons may be proposed for the price constancy. First, it may be argued that 
the producers were in a competitive environment to begin with and so could not afford 
to decrease the price. But this can be easily discarded since the big 4 record labels 
(Universal, Sony BMG, EMI, Warner) essentially dominate the market and they are 
sometimes alleged to collude on price fixing.
2 Alternatively, it is possible that 
consumers are substantially differentiated with respect to their valuations and attitudes 
towards the music so that the producers reacted by concentrating on the higher segment 
of the consumer population. In other words, the digitalization may have made it possible 
for the producers to provide more value to the high-valuation consumers so it was best 
to take a price strategy on them (while sacrificing the quantity on the low-valuation 
consumers.) Our framework supports the latter interpretation. We find that the sampling 
effect substantially increased consumers’ benefits and it worked better for the high-
valuation consumers. 
We then fit the model to these empirical observations. We first find that, while the 
impact of digitalization on the producers’ profits is probably negative, it may not be as 
severe as the observed impact on the quantity. In particular, we show that the sampling 
effect sometimes acts to reduce the revenue while it always increases the profit. 
Moreover, digitalization may lower the fixed costs of distribution as well as increasing 
the additional revenue from complementary products such as live performance. On the 
other hand, the impact of digitalization on the consumer surplus is unambiguously 
positive: Consumers have benefited from all the possible effects of digitalization. We 
find that the impact on the social welfare is rather ambiguous. We show that the impact 
is positive if and only if consumers’ reproduction costs were relatively small. Numerical 
calculations further reveal that the social welfare has increased for most parameter 
values. We also show that enhanced copyright protection to counteract the impacts of 
                                            
2 See FTC Press Release on May 10, 2000, ‘Record Companies Settle FTC Charges of Restraining 
Competition in CD Music Market.’   4
digitalization may have an unexpected effect on the social welfare. 
    The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the model to evaluate 
the impacts of digitalization, and does some comparative statics before and after 
digitalization. Section 3 discusses the empirical observations, and determines the 
possible impacts of digitalization. It also briefly discusses the possible effect of 
enhanced copyright protection on the social welfare. Section 4 concludes. 
 
2. The model 
 
Consider a music product that is produced by a monopolistic producer (record 
company, music label, or publisher). We first study the benchmark case of traditional 
distribution. We then see how the digitalization of music distribution affects the relevant 
variables. We finally discuss the possible effect of further copyright protection. The 
model we employ is the one developed in Yoon (2002) for the study of copyright 
protection. Similar models are used in subsequent works including Belleflamme (2003) 
and Bae and Choi (2006).
3 
 
2.1. The benchmark 
 
There are consumers who are interested in the product. Each consumer consumes at 
most one unit of the product. We denote the set of consumers by  I  and the valuation 
of consumer  iI ∈  by  i v . Consumers can consume the product either by purchasing 
from the original producer or by making unauthorized reproductions, i.e., by making 
copies. When iI ∈  buys the product, her net utility is  i vp − , where  p  is the 
monopolist’s price. When  iI ∈  copies the product, her net utility is  (1 ) i vz α −− . The 
parameter  α  measures the quality degradation of a copy, with 01 α << .
4 The 
parameter  z  captures the reproduction costs, including the physical costs as well as 
the inconveniences consumers have to bear in making the copies. If we let  ii wv z α ≡+  
be termed as the gross reproduction cost, the net utility from a copy is  ii vw − . The 
utility when a consumer does not consume the product is normalized to zero.   
Consumer  i will make the following choices depending on the relative magnitudes 
of  , , and   ii vw p . When  min{ , , } ii p vwp = , consumer  i purchases from the producer. 
When min{ , , } ii i wv w p = , consumer i   makes an unauthorized copy. When 
                                            
3  Peitz and Waelbroeck (2006a) is a comprehensive review of the relevant literature.   
4  The quality degradation may also come from the lack of accompanying lyrics, the lack of photographic 
illustrations of the singers, the lack of technical supports, and so on. See Yoon (2002) for a more detailed 
discussion of the model setup.   5
min{ , , } ii i vv w p = , consumer  i  does not consume the product. 
For a concrete analysis, assume that consumers’ valuations are uniformly distributed 
over the unit interval  [0,1]. Thus, we can identify the set  I   of consumers with the set 
of valuations, which is the unit interval. Then, consumers’ choices given the price can 
be summarized as follows. 
 
(a) When /(1 ) pz α <− : This is the case when the monopolist’s price is set low 
enough that no consumer makes an unauthorized copy. Consumers who belong to 
[0, ) p  do not consume the product, while consumers who belong to  [ ,1] p  buy 
from the monopolist. 
(b) When /(1 ) pz α ≥− : This is the case when the unauthorized reproduction exists. 
Consumers who belong to  [0, /(1 )) z α −   do not consume the product, consumers 
who belong to  [ /(1 ),( )/ ) zp z α α −− make unauthorized copies, and consumers 
who belong to  [( )/ ,1] pzα −   buy from the monopolist. 
 
  This is a result in Yoon (2002, Proposition 2), and can be easily proved by using a 
diagram similar to Figure 1 below.
5  By the way, we observe both the legitimate product 
and its unauthorized copies in most real markets. As a matter of fact, copyright 
protection and related issues may not have attracted much academic attention if the 
original producer could profitably set the price low enough to deter unauthorized 
reproduction. Hence, we will be mainly interested in case (b) henceforth. 
The monopolist incurs fixed costs of development, marketing, and promotion. In 
addition, he incurs the marginal reproduction cost of  c for each additional unit of the 
product.
6 We assume  1 cz α ≤+≤  to have both the legitimate product and the copies 
co-exist.
7 Given the consumers’ choices, the monopolist chooses the optimal price and 
quantity by equating his marginal revenue with the marginal cost. The equilibrium 
outcome for case (b) is characterized as follows.
8 The equilibrium price, quantity, and 
profit are given by 
                                            
5 Note that Figure 1 deals with the case after digitalization. If we set  ',0 ,  ' ,   a n d  ' s cc zz α α = == = , 
this diagram can also be used for the benchmark case here. 
6 The marginal cost may include marketing and/or promotion costs in addition to the costs directly 
related to the production and distribution. 
7 If  1 z α +> , then  wv z v α ≡ +> for all  [0,1] v∈ . So there exists no unauthorized reproduction. If 
cz α >+ , then no consumer buys from the monopolist. See Yoon (2002) for details. 
8 To have an equilibrium outcome in which both the original and copies exist, i.e., of case (b), the 














Consumers who belong to  [0, /(1 )) z α −  do not consume the product, consumers who 
belong to [ /(1 ),( )/2 ) zc z α αα −+ −  make unauthorized copies, and consumers who 
belong to  [( )/2 ,1] cz α α +−   buy from the monopolist.
9 
The consumer surplus  CS   and the social welfare  SW   are given by 
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2.2. The digitalization 
 
The digitalization of music products affects several aspects of the model. First, the 
cost structure of music production changes.  Let  ' c  denote the new marginal cost. 
Second, the parameters that pertain to unauthorized reproduction may be affected. Let 
' α  and  ' z  denote the new quality degradation parameter and the consumers’ 
reproduction costs, respectively. Finally, digitalization may enhance the valuation that 
consumers obtain from legitimate music products. The reason is due to the ‘sampling 
effect’ among others: Sampling allows users to experience the music and to find better 
fits for their tastes. In other words, as Liebowitz (2005) convincingly argues with a 
candy bar example, sampling in effect provides the users more utility. We want to note 
that we are not saying here that the actual sales may increase due to sampling,
10 but 
only that consumers’ valuations may increase because of enhanced satisfaction or 
reduced risks associated with the purchase. We introduce another parameter s  to 
capture this effect. 
We now assume that consumer  i  gets the net utility of  (1 ) i sv p + −   when she buys 
from the monopolist, with  0 s ≥ . The net utility from a copy is  (1 ') ' ' ii i vzvw α − −≡− , 
                                            
9 This is a result in Yoon(2002, Proposition 3(i)). Alternatively, we can apply the analysis in the next 
subsection by setting  ' , 0, ' ,  and ' s cc zz α α == = = . 
10 Peitz and Waelbroeck (2006b) show that the music industry may gain from sampling if there is 
sufficient taste heterogeneity and sufficient product diversity. Our main concern in this paper, however, is 
different. As a matter of fact, we show below that the sampling effect may sometimes decrease the 
revenue. See the discussion after Figure 2.   7
and the net utility from no consumption is normalized again to zero. Consumer choice is 
determined by the relative magnitudes of  (1 ) i sv p + − , (1 ') ' i vz α − − , and zero. Since   
 
max{(1 ) , ( ' '),0} min{ , ' ', } sv pv v z p s v v z v α α +− − + ⇔ − + , 
 
we can determine consumers’ choices by using the following diagram.   
 
Hence, given the monopolist’s price  p , consumers who belong to  [0, '/(1 ')) z α −  do 
not consume the product, consumers who belong to  [' / ( 1 ' ) , ( ' ) / (' ) ) zp z s α α − −+  make 
unauthorized copies, and consumers who belong to  [( ')/( ' ),1] p zs α − +   buy from the 
monopolist.  
Note that the diagram is shown for the case when unauthorized copies co-exist with 
the original. Similar diagram can be drawn for the case when the monopolist charges the 
price low enough that no consumer makes an unauthorized copy. 
The demand function for the legitimate product is therefore 
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By equating this with the marginal cost of  ' c  for the case when unauthorized copies 
co-exist with legitimate products,
11 we get the equilibrium price, quantity, and profit 
after digitalization as 
{}
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The consumers’ choices can be summarized as follows: 
(i)  Consumers who belong to  [0, '/(1 ')) z α −   do not consume the product,   
(ii)  Consumers who belong to [ '/(1 '),( ' ' ')/2( ' )) zs c z s α αα − ++− +  make 
unauthorized copies, and   
(iii)  Consumers who belong to [( ' ' ')/2( ' ),1] scz s α α + +− +   buy from the 
monopolist.  
The new consumer surplus  ' CS   and the new social welfare  ' SW  are 
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2.3. Comparative statics 
 
We now turn to some comparative statics. To relate the benchmark to the digitalization, 

































Moreover, we have 
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(,,,) (,,,) (,,,) S W scz C S scz scz α απ α =+ . 
                                            
11   For this, the condition  ''' 2 ( ' ) ' / ( 1' ) cz s s z α αα ≥−− + + − , or to rearrange, the condition 
'( 1 ' ) (' ') / ( 1 ' 2 ) zc s s α αα ≤− ++ ++  needs  to  hold.   9
 
Then, the equilibrium prices of the benchmark and after digitalization are  ( ,0, , ) p cz α  
and ( ', , ', ') p sc z α , respectively. We have similar expressions for other variables. We 
restate two relevant inequality constraints 
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that ensure the co-existence equilibrium outcome in which both the legitimate purchase 
and the unauthorized reproduction prevail. 










Hence, the equilibrium price increases as a copy’s quality degradation (α ), the 
additional benefits ( s ), the monopolist’s marginal costs (c ), and the consumers’ 
reproduction costs ( z ) increase. Note that the positive effects of α  and  z  are 
intuitive since the copies are (inferior) substitutes of the original. It is also obvious to 
see the positive effects of  s and c. 
Next, we have 
2
11
;   0;   0
2( ) 2( ) 2( )
qq z c q q
ss cs z s αα α α
∂∂ − ∂ ∂
== − = − < = >
∂∂ + ∂ + ∂ +
. 
Hence, an increase in c  decreases the equilibrium quantity, while an increase z  
increases it. The effects of both α  and s  are the same, and may be positive or 
negative depending on the relative magnitudes of c  and  z . So, the effects are 
negative when the consumers’ marginal cost is higher than the monopolist’s marginal 
cost, and vice versa. Figure 2 shows the marginal revenue curve 
() 2 ( ) MRq s z sq α α =+ + − + . When α  or  s  increases, the curve turns clockwise 




                                            
12 We  note  that  // 0 qq s α ∂∂= ∂∂ <   is possible only when  1/ ( 1) 1 / 2 z α − −>   as well as  cz < .   10
 
Figure 2: Marginal Revenue 
 
It is worth noting that the revenue  R pq = ⋅  may increase or decrease when  α  or 
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It is easy to see that  /0 Rs ∂∂ >  when cz ≥   (since, in that case, both the quantity and 
the price increase) and also when  0 c =  by the inequality constraint (2). Though 
/0 Rs ∂∂ >  for most parameter values, there do exist cases when  /0 Rs ∂∂ < . For 
example, when (α ,s,c,z )=(0.1, 0.0, 0.1, 0.16), we have  / 0.0056 Rs ∂ ∂= − . Note that 
the parameter values satisfy inequality constraint (1) and (2) as well as  cz < . Note also 
that the same argument applies to  α  since  // R Rs α ∂ ∂= ∂ ∂ . 
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Note that  0 szc α ++−≥ by the inequality constraint (1), and  0 scz α ++−≥ by 
the inequality constraint (2) above. All these effects seem quite intuitive. 
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These effects are also quite intuitive.   
Finally, we can easily see that 
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As for the effect of consumers’ reproduction costs, observe that the function 
1
24 ( )1 2 ( )




∂+ + − + + −
=− − + +
∂+ − +
 
is a strictly increasing function of  z   over the interval 
[0,(1 )( )/(1 2 )] sc s α αα −+ ++ + . We also find that 
/( 3 ) / ( 4 ( ) ) 0 SW z s c s α α ∂∂ = − + + + <  at  0 z = , and 
/( 1 ) / ( 2 ( 1 2 ) ) 0 SW z s c s α ∂∂ = + − + +>  at  (1 )( ) /(1 2 ) zs c s α αα = −+ ++ + . Therefore, 
the social welfare is a convex function which attains its minimum at 
 
*( 1 ) ( 3 ) / ( 3 4 ) zs c s α αα =− + + ++ . 
 
The SW strictly decreases over the interval [0, *] z  and strictly increases over the 
interval [ *,(1 )( )/(1 2 )] zs c s α αα −+ ++ + . See Figure 3 below for representative 
curves. This behavior of the social welfare is due to two countervailing effects. First, an 
increase in  z  directly decreases the social welfare since it increases the reproduction 
costs of those consumers who choose to copy. Second, an increase in  z  induces some 
consumers to switch from making copies to buying from the original producer. This 
increases the social welfare because this switch decreases the social costs of production: 
Note that the marginal consumers’ reproduction costs who switch are higher than the 
producer’s marginal cost due to the monopoly pricing.
13  
As for the quality degradation, we observe that the function 
22
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is a strictly increasing function of  α , so the social welfare is a convex function of  α . 
Depending on the relative magnitude of the parameters, the effect of  α  on SW  may 
                                            
13  For a detailed discussion, see Yoon (2002).   12
be positive or negative. 
Summarizing the discussion, we have the following table. 
 
<Table 1> Comparative statics 
  p ∂   q ∂   π ∂   CS ∂   SW ∂  
α ∂   + +  or  − +  −  + or  − 
s ∂   + +  or  − +  +  + 
c ∂   +  −  −  −  − 
z ∂   + + + −  − then  + 
 
 
3. Main results 
 
3.1. The impacts of digitalization 
 
As discussed earlier, the digitalization of music products affects the equilibrium 
outcome through various routes: The quality of unauthorized copies may change (α  to 
' α ), consumers may get additional benefits ( 0 s ≥ ), the original producer’s marginal 
cost may change (c to  ' c ), and the consumers’ reproduction costs may change (z  to 
' z ). Therefore, it is a difficult task to measure the net impacts of digitalization. 
Nevertheless, we will try to calibrate the model using some empirical observations 
about the price and the quantity, and determine the impacts of digitalization on the profit, 
the consumer surplus, and the social welfare. We are fully aware that this exercise is 
only heuristic at the best, and more empirical works need to be accumulated to 
accurately pin down the actual effects of digitalization. 
One of the most obvious empirical facts after digitalization is the decline in the sales 
of recorded music. Liebowitz (2006), for example, estimates that the actual sales in the 
United States have dropped up to 30% after digitalization.
14  While various explanations 
may be possible to account for this decrease,
15 most of the existing empirical works 
attribute the major cause to the file sharing activities made possible by the digitalization. 
For example, Peitz and Waelbroeck (2004) find that music downloading could have 
caused a 20% reduction in music sales worldwide between 1998-2002. Michel (2006) 
                                            
14  See Figure 3 of Liebowitz (2006). He uses the RIAA (Recording Industry Association of America) data 
on unit quantities of full-length albums. 
15 Liebowitz (2005), for example, considers other factors such as income changes, changes in 
substitute/complement markets, changes in the quality of music, and changes in the supply of music for 
possible explanations.   13
finds that some music consumers could have decreased their CD purchases (prior to 
2004) by about 13% due to Internet file sharing. Zentner (2006) finds that music 
downloading reduces the probability of buying music by 30%, and sales in 2002 would 
have been around 7.8% higher without downloads.
16 This is plausible since the 
unauthorized copies easily obtainable through the Internet directly compete with the 
legitimate copies. 
Another interesting and rather puzzling empirical fact after digitalization is the virtual 
constancy of the album prices, especially in the United States. Liebowitz (2006) 
observes that ‘the list prices adjusted for inflation have been virtually constant for the 
last decade,’ and Peitz and Waelbroeck (2005) provide similar observations.
17 If we 
admit that the unauthorized copies work as substitutes for the legitimate copies, we 
naturally expect that the original producer’s price should be lower after the file sharing 
activities. But, we observe otherwise. Why is this happening? 
To see the reason, let us fit our model to these empirical observations. We make the 
following assumptions on the parameter changes. First, the move to online distribution 
channel seems to reduce the marginal costs of reproduction and distribution. In addition, 
the marketing and promotion costs would probably decline. It is thus fair to assume that 
the new marginal cost  ' c  is not higher than the original marginal cost c, that is, 
' cc ≤ . Second, the quality degradation parameter may not increase due to digitalization, 
that is to say, digitalization may not deteriorate the quality of unauthorized copies. So, 
assume  ' α α ≤ . Third, the consumers’ reproduction costs may decrease due to easier 
access (say, via P2P networks) and copying technology. So, assume  ' zz ≤ . Finally, we 
already set  0 s ≥   to reflect the sampling effect. 
Given the comparative static analysis of the previous section, it is not hard to see that 
consumers get substantial additional benefits from the digitalization. The observed price 
has remained virtually constant while the changes in  α ,c, and  z  after digitalization 
should have lowered it. Hence, the increase in  0 s >  must have counteracted against 
the price decrease. On the other hand, the cause for the observed decrease in quantity 
may have come from several directions: The decreased reproduction costs  z  have 
stolen significant parts of the legitimate demand, and the monopolist may have reacted 
to the additional benefit factor  s  by focusing more on the high valuation consumers.
18 
It is noteworthy that the consumer surplus has increased undoubtedly after the 
                                            
16 On the other hand, Oberholzer and Strumpf (2005) find that file sharing has only had a limited effect 
on record sales. 
17 See p. 21 as will as footnote 30 of Liebowitz (2006), and Figures 4 and 5 of Peitz and Waelbroeck 
(2005). 
18  Recall that the optimal quantity decreases as  s  increases  when cz < .
    14
digitalization, while the profit and the social welfare may have increased or decreased. 
We now further specify the model to investigate the possible impacts of digitalization 
in depth. Let us assume that  '0 cc = = , as many previous papers on the copyright 
issues do.
19 That is, we assume that the marginal reproduction costs of the legitimate 
copies are negligible. Casual observation seems to support this normalization since the 
variable costs are quite low compared to the album price. Let us also assume  ' α α = , 
that is, the quality degradation parameter remains constant. Note that the sound quality 
of MP3 music files shared on the P2P networks is generally perceived to be inferior to 
the sound quality of the original soundtracks of CDs due to the compression rates. 
Observe also that the quality degradation may result from the lack of accompanying 
lyrics, the lack of photographic illustrations of the singers, and the lack of technical 
supports. It is therefore reasonable to assume that the quality degradation parameter 
pertaining to unauthorized copies did not change significantly even with the advent of 
online distribution. On the other hand, we capture the effects of digitalization on 
unauthorized copies with the parameter z . We assume  ' zz < , because the digital 
distribution channel made it easier for consumers to access and copy the music files. 
    With these additional assumptions, the price and quantity changes after digitalization 
are 
'




α α ++ +
=⇒ = ; 
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The empirical fact of constant price implies that  ' zsz + = . Moreover, the actual 








Hence, regarding the impact on the price, the additional benefits factor has just offset 
the decrease in the consumers’ reproduction costs, and that factor is about 43% (25%, 
11%, respectively) of the quality degradation parameter when the quantity decreases by 
30% (20%, 10%, respectively).
20 Note  that s  has a positive relationship with  x. 
The change in the profit after digitalization is given by 
                                            
19  See, for example, Belleflamme (2003) and Bae and Choi (2006). 
20  We mention that other factors that may affect the quantity decline work to change the price either way. 
Hence, price constancy may be sustained regardless of the actual quantity change due to the digitalization.   15
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The change in the profit is equivalent to the change in the quantity since the marginal 
cost is assumed to be zero and the actual price did not change. Hence, the profit has 
decreased by 100 % x . As Liebowitz (2006, p. 18) argues, the sampling effect (the 
increase in  s) could not ‘counterbalance the negative impacts of the substitution effect’ 
(the decrease in  z ). We want to add, however, that the present model does not consider 
the possible changes in fixed costs. It is generally expected that the digitalization may 
substantially lower the distribution costs. In particular, sampling may replace costly 
marketing and promotion activities. Moreover, the file sharing activity may also 
increase the additional revenue from complementary products such as live performance 
by broadening the audiences. See Gayer and Shy (2006) for a related discussion. It is 
therefore possible that the profit has not decreased so much as predicted in this simple 
model. On the other hand, we have  0 CS Δ > , as discussed earlier, since  /0 CS s ∂∂ >  
and  /0 CS z ∂∂ < . So, the consumer surplus has increased. 
    To see the impact on the social welfare, let us define  0 ss s Δ =−= and  ' zzz Δ= − . 
Note that  s Δ  and  z Δ  are positive, and both are equal to  /(1 ) x x α − .  Then, the 
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Since 5 /8(1 ) 0 SW x x α Δ= − >  at  0 z =  and  3 /8 (1 ) 0 SW x x α Δ =− − <  at  1 z α =− , 
we conclude that the social welfare has increased after digitalization if and only if  z  is 
small. The reason is that the social welfare is a decreasing function of  z  for small 
*( 1 ) ( ) / ( 3 4 ) zz s s α αα <≡ − + + +   and an increasing function of  z  for  large  * zz > . 
The following table shows numerical calculations for some parameter values. The 
numbers in the cells of columns 2-4 are the cut-off values of  z  corresponding to 
respective  α  and  x. For example, when  0.2 α =  and  0.3 x = , the cut-off is 0.161. 
The social welfare increases for the initial values of  z   that are smaller than the cut-off, 
while it decreases for the values of  z  that exceed the cut-off. The last column shows 
the upper bound for  z  given by inequality constraint (2) above. That is, only the 
                                            
21 We measure the impact at the initial point, that is, prior to the digitalization by setting  0 s = . We get 
the same qualitative conclusion when we measure the impact at the final point, that is, posterior to the 
digitalization by setting  /(1 ) s xx α =− .   16
values of  z   below the upper bound are relevant. 
 
<Table 2> The upper bound and the cut-off values of  z  
  0.1 x =   0.2 x =   0.3 x =   upper bound 
for  z  
0.05 α =   0.034 0.040 0.046 0.045 
0.1 α =   0.066 0.076 0.088 0.082 
0.2 α =   0.120 0.138 0.161 0.133 
0.3 α =   0.160 0.186 0.218 0.162 
0.4 α =   0.187 0.219 0.259 0.171 
0.5 α =   0.198 0.237 0.284 0.166 
Note: The cut-off values are found numerically by setting the difference in social welfare functions 
(, / ( 1 ) , 0 , / ( 1 ) ) (, 0 , 0 ,) SW x x z x x SW z α αα α −− − −  to  zero. 
 
Note that the cut-off increases as  α  and  x increase. That is, the social welfare is 
more likely to increase when the quality degradation is higher and/or the actual sales 
decline is higher. Table 2 reveals that the social welfare increases for most values of the 
parameters. In particular, the social welfare increases unambiguously in the case of a 
30% quantity decline since the cut-off is always higher than the upper bound. The social 
welfare also increases unambiguously for parameter values of  α  exceeding  0.4.  
In summary, empirical facts support the conclusion that (i) the profit has decreased, 
(ii) the consumer surplus has increased, and (iii) the social welfare has either increased 
or decreased due to the digitalization. The social welfare has increased if and only if the 
consumers’ reproduction costs have been relatively low, and numerical calculations 
reveal that it has increased for most parameter values. 
 
3.2. The effect of further protection 
 
  The empirical observations together with our model support the conclusion that 
firms’ profits have declined due to digital music distribution. This is so even when the 
additional benefits factor  s may have contributed positively to the profits. Hence, the 
firms’ incentive to develop valuable new products may not be sufficiently provided 
since the profits may not cover the development and other costs. Addressing this 
problem, it is often argued that further protection of legitimate copies is desirable. This 
protection is either legal protection such as strengthened copyright laws and 
enforcement or technological protection such as use of digital rights management   17
technology.
22 
  It is a very difficult task to discuss the trade-off between dynamic efficiency and 
static efficiency, that is, to meaningfully compare the development phase and the usage 
phase of the copyrightable works and obtain testable conclusions on the relevant 
economic variables. We do not attempt to do this in this paper. Instead, while fully 
appreciating the importance of the dynamic incentive to create, we just want to point out 
the fact that ‘reversing the substitution effect’ by increasing z  with legal and/or 
technological measures may have some unwanted effects on the social welfare. One 
may reason that this reversal will also reverse the impact of  z  on the social welfare. 
So, if the effect of  z  on the social welfare has been negative, then the stronger 
copyright or the digital rights management technology would increase the social welfare. 
This is not true. 
  Figure 3 depicts two social welfare curves as functions of z . The curve  1 SW  
corresponds to the benchmark before the digitalization, while the curve  2 SW  
corresponds to the situation after the digitalization. Since  s has increased,  2 SW  lies 
above  1 SW . Observe also that 
*
1 z , the minimum point of  1 SW , lies to the left of 
*
2 z , 
the minimum point of  2 SW . 
 
 
                                            
22  The DRM, short for the digital rights management, technology can be defined generally as the ‘secure 
packaging and delivery software designed to prevent purchasers and third parties from making 
unauthorized uses of digital works.’ The DRM is a small piece of software that can detect, monitor and 
block use of copyrighted material. The DRM for music generally includes: copy control, watermarking, 
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Figure 3: The social welfare 
 
Suppose that the initial reproduction cost was relatively high, say somewhat bigger than 
*
1 z . Then, the digitalization that has lowered  z  would have a negative impact on the 
social welfare along the curve  1 SW . An increase in  z  after digitalization, however, 
will change the social welfare along the curve  2 SW . As long as this increase does not 
go beyond 
*
2 z , we see that the effect on the social welfare is negative again, further 
decreasing the social welfare. If, on the other hand, the effect of  z  on the social 
welfare has been positive, an increased protection would decrease the social welfare. 




There have been lively debates regarding the impact of the file sharing technology on 
the music industry. Most of the arguments, however, are concerned with the causes of 
the sales decline and its possible consequences on music producers. In this paper, we 
took it one step further and studied the impacts on such important economic variables as 
the profit, the consumer surplus, and the social welfare. 
We constructed a representative model that enabled the comparative static analysis. 
We then fitted the model to the empirical observations of substantial sales decline and 
constant price. Main findings are as follows. First, though the producers’ profits have 
probably shrunk, the decrease may not be as severe as the observed sales decline. 
Second, the consumer surplus has unambiguously increased. Third, the social welfare 
may have increased or decreased. It has increased if and only if the consumers’ 
reproduction costs have been relatively low, and numerical calculations reveal that it has 
increased for most parameter values. 
We are fully aware that these conclusions are only suggestive. In particular, though 
we have tried to make the assumptions on the model specification as reasonable as 
possible, they still need to be justified by substantial empirical endeavor. We hope that 
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